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Understanding the history of psychiatry requires an accurate view of its function and purpose. In this provocative new study, Szasz challenges conventional beliefs about psychiatry. He asserts that, in fact, psychiatrists are not concerned with the diagnosis and treatment of bona fide illnesses. Psychiatric tradition, social expectation, and the law make it clear that coercion is the profession's determining characteristic. Psychiatrists may "diagnose" or "treat" people without their consent or even against their clearly expressed wishes, and these involuntary psychiatric interventions are as different as are sexual relations between consenting adults and the sexual violence we call "rape." But the point is not merely the difference between coerced and consensual psychiatry, but to contrast them. The term "psychiatry" ought to be applied to one or the other, but not both. As long as psychiatrists and society refuse to recognize this, there can be no real psychiatric historiography. The coercive character of psychiatry was more apparent in the past than it is now. Then, insanity was synonymous with unfitness for liberty. Toward the end of the nineteenth century, a new type of psychiatric relationship developed, when people experiencing so-called "nervous symptoms," sought help. This led to a distinction between two kinds of mental diseases: neuroses and psychoses. Persons who complained about their own behavior were classified as neurotic, whereas persons about whose behavior others complained were classified as psychotic. The legal, medical, psychiatric, and social denial of this simple distinction and its far-reaching implications undergirds the house of cards that is modern psychiatry. Coercion as Cure is the most important book by Szasz since his landmark The Myth of Mental Illness.

In a world in which children exhibit levels of violence that are strikingly unchildlike, the question of how to rear children takes on an immediacy for parents and psychologists. Among the issues treated here are whether physical punishment prevents further outbreaks of violent behavior or if there are ways of influencing children so that punishment is not necessary. Drawing upon rich, longitudinal data, the contributors to this volume examine the benefits and costs of coercion and punishment, considering such issues as mental health, antisocial and criminal behavior, substance abuse, and issues related to measurement and prediction. They look at coercion among peers, aggressive behavior in boys and girls, different parenting styles and effects of home context. The volume draws together evidence about coercion and punishment that have appeared in disparate literatures, and it raises questions about easy assumptions regarding them.

In asymmetric interstate conflicts, great powers have the capability to coerce weak states by threatening their survival―but not vice versa. It is therefore the great power that decides whether to escalate a conflict into a crisis by adopting a coercive strategy. In practice, however, the coercive strategies of the U.S. have frequently failed. In Coercion, Survival and War Phil Haun chronicles 30 asymmetric interstate crises involving the US from 1918 to 2003. The U.S. chose coercive strategies in 23 of these cases, but coercion failed half of the time: most often because the more powerful U.S. made demands that threatened the very survival of the weak state, causing it to resist as long as it had the means to do so. It is an unfortunate paradox Haun notes that, where the U.S. may prefer brute force to coercion, these power asymmetries may well lead it to first attempt coercive strategies that are expected to fail in order to justify the war it desires. He concludes that, when coercion is preferred to brute force there are clear limits as to what can be demanded. In such cases, he suggests, U.S. policymakers can improve the chances of success by matching appropriate threats to demands, by including other great powers in the coercive process, and by reducing a weak state leader's reputational costs by giving him or her face-saving options.

In asymmetric interstate conflicts, great powers have the capability to coerce weak states by threatening their survival―but not vice versa. It is therefore the great power that decides whether to escalate a conflict into a crisis by adopting a coercive strategy. In practice, however, the coercive strategies of the U.S. have frequently failed. In Coercion, Survival and War Phil Haun chronicles 30 asymmetric interstate crises involving the US from 1918 to 2003. The U.S. chose coercive strategies in 23 of these cases, but coercion failed half of the time: most often because the more powerful U.S. made demands that threatened the very survival of the weak state, causing it to resist as long as it had the means to do so. It is an unfortunate paradox Haun notes that, where the U.S. may prefer brute force to coercion, these power asymmetries may well lead it to first attempt coercive strategies that are expected to fail in order to justify the war it desires. He concludes that, when coercion is preferred to brute force there are clear limits as to what can be demanded. In such cases, he suggests, U.S. policymakers can improve the chances of success by matching appropriate threats to demands, by including other great powers in the coercive process, and by reducing a weak state leader's reputational costs by giving him or her face-saving options.

"Since [Robert Nozick's 'Coercion'], there has been a steadily ... growing literature on coercion, a literature that on the leading issue has divided itself into two types of theories. In one camp are those who view coercion as an empirical or descriptive concept, and who thus hold that the truth or falsity of a coercion claim can be decided by an appeal to facts; in the other camp we find proponents of the position that coercion is a normative or moralized concept and who argue, therefore, that the truth or falsity of coercion claims rests upon a well-developed moral theory. In Coercion, Alan Wertheimer sets forth what must now be considered the most detailed and defensible version of the normative position." -Stuart D. Warner, Ethics "Wertheimer attempts to move beyond previous theories of coercion by conducting a fairly extensive survey of the way in which cases involving coercion have been treated by American courts. This impressive project occupies the first half of the book, where he makes a convincing case that there is a fairly unified 'theory of coercion' at work in adjudication, past and present. This legal theory, however, is not entirely adequate for the purposes of social and political philosophy, and the last half of the book develops Wertheimer's more comprehensive philosophical theory. Here again, he seems to be successful. A vast array of recent philosophical literature is reviewed, making the bibliographic sections of the book noteworthy. Coercion should appeal to a wide audience. Readers with technical interests in law, political science, and philosophy will find along with general readers that the overall thesis of the book is accessible, especially because of Wertheimer's sharp and clear writing style." -Choice Alan Wertheimer is Professor of Political Science at the University of Vermont.

Understanding the history of psychiatry requires an accurate view of its function and purpose. In this provocative new study, Szasz challenges conventional beliefs about psychiatry. He asserts that, in fact, psychiatrists are not concerned with the diagnosis and treatment of bona fide illnesses. Psychiatric tradition, social expectation, and the law make it clear that coercion is the profession's determining characteristic. Psychiatrists may "diagnose" or "treat" people without their consent or even against their clearly expressed wishes, and these involuntary psychiatric interventions are as different as are sexual relations between consenting adults and the sexual violence we call "rape." But the point is not merely the difference between coerced and consensual psychiatry, but to contrast them. The term "psychiatry" ought to be applied to one or the other, but not both. As long as psychiatrists and society refuse to recognize this, there can be no real psychiatric historiography. The coercive character of psychiatry was more apparent in the past than it is now. Then, insanity was synonymous with unfitness for liberty. Toward the end of the nineteenth century, a new type of psychiatric relationship developed, when people experiencing so-called "nervous symptoms," sought help. This led to a distinction between two kinds of mental diseases: neuroses and psychoses. Persons who complained about their own behavior were classified as neurotic, whereas persons about whose behavior others complained were classified as psychotic. The legal, medical, psychiatric, and social denial of this simple distinction and its far-reaching implications undergirds the house of cards that is modern psychiatry. Coercion as Cure is the most important book by Szasz since his landmark The Myth of Mental Illness.

In this pathbreaking work, now available in paperback, Charles Tilly challenges all previous formulations of state development in Europe. Specifically, Tilly charges that most available explanations fail because they do not account for the great variety of kinds of states which were viable at different stages of European history, and because they assume a unilinear path of state development resolving in today's national state.

In this work, Charles Tilly challenges all previous formulations of state development in Europe, including his own Formation of National States in Western Europe. Specifically, Tilly argues that most available explanations fail because they do not account for the great variety of kinds of states which were viable at different stages of European history, and because they assume a unilinear path of state development resolving in today's national state. Thus, the central question for Tilly is this: "what accounts for the great variation over time and space in the kinds of state that have prevailed in Europe since AD 990?". Tilly aims to demonstrate how various interactions between the wielders of coercion and the manipulators of capital produced three major types of states which prevailed during long periods of European history: tribute-making empires, systems of fragmented sovereignty and national states. Drawing on the contributions of Barrington Moore, Stein Rokkan and Lewis Mumford, Tilly aims to put to rest the conception of European state development as a single, unilinear process and, in so doing, places relations among states at the centre of the analysis of the process of state formation.

In this work, Charles Tilly challenges all previous formulations of state development in Europe, including his own Formation of National States in Western Europe. Specifically, Tilly argues that most available explanations fail because they do not account for the great variety of kinds of states which were viable at different stages of European history, and because they assume a unilinear path of state development resolving in today's national state. Thus, the central question for Tilly is this: "what accounts for the great variation over time and space in the kinds of state that have prevailed in Europe since AD 990?". Tilly aims to demonstrate how various interactions between the wielders of coercion and the manipulators of capital produced three major types of states which prevailed during long periods of European history: tribute-making empires, systems of fragmented sovereignty and national states. Drawing on the contributions of Barrington Moore, Stein Rokkan and Lewis Mumford, Tilly aims to put to rest the conception of European state development as a single, unilinear process and, in so doing, places relations among states at the centre of the analysis of the process of state formation.

Understanding the history of psychiatry requires an accurate view of its function and purpose. In this provocative new study, Szasz challenges conventional beliefs about psychiatry. He asserts that, in fact, psychiatrists are not concerned with the diagnosis and treatment of bona fide illnesses. Psychiatric tradition, social expectation, and the law make it clear that coercion is the profession's determining characteristic. Psychiatrists may "diagnose" or "treat" people without their consent or even against their clearly expressed wishes, and these involuntary psychiatric interventions are as different as are sexual relations between consenting adults and the sexual violence we call "rape." But the point is not merely the difference between coerced and consensual psychiatry, but to contrast them. The term "psychiatry" ought to be applied to one or the other, but not both. As long as psychiatrists and society refuse to recognize this, there can be no real psychiatric historiography. The coercive character of psychiatry was more apparent in the past than it is now. Then, insanity was synonymous with unfitness for liberty. Toward the end of the nineteenth century, a new type of psychiatric relationship developed, when people experiencing so-called "nervous symptoms," sought help. This led to a distinction between two kinds of mental diseases: neuroses and psychoses. Persons who complained about their own behavior were classified as neurotic, whereas persons about whose behavior others complained were classified as psychotic. The legal, medical, psychiatric, and social denial of this simple distinction and its far-reaching implications undergirds the house of cards that is modern psychiatry. Coercion as Cure is the most important book by Szasz since his landmark The Myth of Mental Illness.

Do you use Coercion? No? When you have finished this book, you are going to be very surprised; you are going to know some things about yourself that you never knew before. We use coercion almost exclusively to control each other; many find it hard to imagine any other way. The author asks, Does the death penalty deter potential murderers? Is harsh retaliation the answer to the discipline problem in our schools? Do the standard coercive practices work? - in law enforcement, behavior therapy, education, the family, business, the armed forces, diplomacy. Behavior analysis has shown that they do not work. Coercion is in the long run self-defeating. Punishment eventually proves counterproductive. Sidman presents a rational discussion of matters in which emotions usually run strong. He proposes that what we have learned in the laboratory can provide guides both for personal conduct and public policy

This volume brings together the recent essays of Richard Ned Lebow, one of the leading scholars of international relations and US foreign policy. Lebow's work has centred on the instrumental value of ethics in foreign policy decision making and the disastrous consequences which follow when ethical standards are flouted. Unlike most realists who have considered ethical considerations irrelevant in states' calculations of their national interest, Lebow has argued that self interest, and hence, national interest can only be formulated intelligently within a language of justice and morality. The essays here build on this pervasive theme in Lebow's work by presenting his substantive and compelling critique of strategies of deterrence and compellence, illustrating empirically and normatively how these strategies often produce results counter to those that are intended. The last section of the book, on counterfactuals, brings together another set of related articles which continue to probe the relationship between ethics and policy. They do so by exploring the contingency of events to suggest the subjective, and often self-fulfilling, nature of the frameworks we use to evaluate policy choices.

In 1945 the new Labour government decided to use techniques of persuasion to convince the people of Britain that their way was best. Crofts exposes the deficiences of the Atlee government's propaganda. This book should be of interest to students and teachers of modern history.

In a world in which children exhibit levels of violence that are strikingly unchildlike, the question of how to rear children takes on an immediacy for parents and psychologists. Among the issues treated here are whether physical punishment prevents further outbreaks of violent behavior or if there are ways of influencing children so that punishment is not necessary. Drawing upon rich, longitudinal data, the contributors to this volume examine the benefits and costs of coercion and punishment, considering such issues as mental health, antisocial and criminal behavior, substance abuse, and issues related to measurement and prediction. They look at coercion among peers, aggressive behavior in boys and girls, different parenting styles and effects of home context. The volume draws together evidence about coercion and punishment that have appeared in disparate literatures, and it raises questions about easy assumptions regarding them.

"Since [Robert Nozick's 'Coercion'], there has been a steadily ... growing literature on coercion, a literature that on the leading issue has divided itself into two types of theories. In one camp are those who view coercion as an empirical or descriptive concept, and who thus hold that the truth or falsity of a coercion claim can be decided by an appeal to facts; in the other camp we find proponents of the position that coercion is a normative or moralized concept and who argue, therefore, that the truth or falsity of coercion claims rests upon a well-developed moral theory. In Coercion, Alan Wertheimer sets forth what must now be considered the most detailed and defensible version of the normative position." -Stuart D. Warner, Ethics "Wertheimer attempts to move beyond previous theories of coercion by conducting a fairly extensive survey of the way in which cases involving coercion have been treated by American courts. This impressive project occupies the first half of the book, where he makes a convincing case that there is a fairly unified 'theory of coercion' at work in adjudication, past and present. This legal theory, however, is not entirely adequate for the purposes of social and political philosophy, and the last half of the book develops Wertheimer's more comprehensive philosophical theory. Here again, he seems to be successful. A vast array of recent philosophical literature is reviewed, making the bibliographic sections of the book noteworthy. Coercion should appeal to a wide audience. Readers with technical interests in law, political science, and philosophy will find along with general readers that the overall thesis of the book is accessible, especially because of Wertheimer's sharp and clear writing style." -Choice Alan Wertheimer is Professor of Political Science at the University of Vermont.

Do you use Coercion? No? When you have finished this book, you are going to be very surprised; you are going to know some things about yourself that you never knew before. We use coercion almost exclusively to control each other; many find it hard to imagine any other way. The author asks, Does the death penalty deter potential murderers? Is harsh retaliation the answer to the discipline problem in our schools? Do the standard coercive practices work? - in law enforcement, behavior therapy, education, the family, business, the armed forces, diplomacy. Behavior analysis has shown that they do not work. Coercion is in the long run self-defeating. Punishment eventually proves counterproductive. Sidman presents a rational discussion of matters in which emotions usually run strong. He proposes that what we have learned in the laboratory can provide guides both for personal conduct and public policy

Novelists have individually distinctive ideas of dialogue, Aaron Fogel argues. In this analysis of Conrad's narrative craft he explores--with broad implications--the theory and uses of dialogue. Conrad's was a distinctive reading of the English language conditioned by his particular idea of forced speech and forced writing. Fogel shows how Conrad shaped ideas and events and interpreted character and institutions by means of dialogues representing not free exchange but various forms of forcing another to respond. He applied this format not only to the obvious political contexts, such as inquisition or spying, but also to seemingly more private relations, such as marriage, commerce, and storytelling. His idea of dialogue shaded the meanings he gave to words even to characters' names. Conrad is particularly interested in scenes in which a speech-forcer is surprised, repudiated, or punished. Fogel concludes that Conrad increasingly saw the punishment of the speech-forcer as classically related to Oedipus inquiries, in which the provoked answers rebound upon and destroy the forcer. This punishment is--as Shakespeare, Scott, and Wordsworth also dramatically intuited--the classical Oedipal dialogue scene. Fogel's analysis ranges widely over Conrad's fiction but focuses especially on Nostromo, The Secret Agent, and Under Western Eyes. His readings offer a balanced critique of Mikhail Bakhtin's theories about dialogic. Conrad's novels have many of the features Bakhtin identified as dialogical; but he was preoccupied with coercion in dialogue form. Fogel proposes that to understand this form is to begin to reconsider our political and aesthetic assumptions about what dialogue is or ought to be.

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Plea bargaining is one of the most striking features of American courts. The vast majority of criminal convictions today are produced through bargained pleas. Where does the practice come from? Whose interests does it serve? Often plea bargaining is imagined as a corruption of the court during the post-World War II years, paradoxically rewarding those who appear guilty rather than those claiming innocence. Yet, as Mary Vogel argues in this pathbreaking history, plea bargaining's roots are deeper and more distinctly American than is commonly supposed.During the Age of Jackson, amidst crime and violence wrought by social change, the courts stepped forward as agents of the state to promote the social order. Plea bargaining arose during the 1830s and 1840s as part of this process of political stabilization and an effort to legitimate institutions of self-rule--accomplishments that were vital to Whig efforts to restore order and reconsolidate their political power. To this end, the tradition of episodic leniency from British common law was recrafted into a new cultural form--plea bargaining--that drew conflicts into the courts while maintaining elite discretion over sentencing policy.In its reliance on the mechanism of leniency, the courts were attempting a sort of social "triage"--sorting those who could be reclaimed as industrious and productive citizens from marginals and transients. The "worthy" often paid fines and were returned to their community under the watchful eyes of their intercessors and that most powerful web of social control, that of everyday life.Created during a period of social mobility, plea bargaining presumed that those with much to lose through conviction would embrace individual reform. Today, when many defendants who come before the court have much less in the way of prospects to lose, leniency may be more likely to be regarded with cynicism, as an act of weakness by the state, and plea bargaining may grow more problematic.

This volume brings together the recent essays of Richard Ned Lebow, one of the leading scholars of international relations and US foreign policy. Lebow's work has centred on the instrumental value of ethics in foreign policy decision making and the disastrous consequences which follow when ethical standards are flouted. Unlike most realists who have considered ethical considerations irrelevant in states' calculations of their national interest, Lebow has argued that self interest, and hence, national interest can only be formulated intelligently within a language of justice and morality. The essays here build on this pervasive theme in Lebow's work by presenting his substantive and compelling critique of strategies of deterrence and compellence, illustrating empirically and normatively how these strategies often produce results counter to those that are intended. The last section of the book, on counterfactuals, brings together another set of related articles which continue to probe the relationship between ethics and policy. They do so by exploring the contingency of events to suggest the subjective, and often self-fulfilling, nature of the frameworks we use to evaluate policy choices.