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The standard wisdom among political scientists has been that "iron triangles" operated among regulatory agencies, the regulated industries, and members of Congress, all presumably with a stake in preserving regulation that protected the industries from competition. Despite almost unanimous agreement among economists that such regulation was inefficient, it seemed highly unlikely that deregulation could occur. Yet between 1975 and 1980 major deregulatory changes that strongly favored competition did take place in a wide range of industries. The results are familiar to airline passengers, users of telephone service, and trucking freight shippers, among others. Martha Derthick and Paul J. Quirk ask why this deregulation happened. How did a diffuse public interest prevail over the powerful industry and union interests that sought to preserve regulation? Why did the regulatory commissions, which were expected to be a major obstacle to deregulation, instead take the initiative on behalf of it? And why did influential members of Congress push for even greater deregulation? The authors concentrate on three cases: airlines, trucking, and telecommunications. They find important similarities among the cases and discuss the implications of these findings for two broader topics: the role that economic analysis has played in policy change, and the capacity of the American political system for transcending narrow interests.

The electricity market has experienced enormous setbacks in delivering on the promise of deregulation. In theory, deregulating the electricity market would increase the efficiency of the industry by producing electricity at lower costs and passing those cost savings on to customers. As Electricity Deregulation shows, successful deregulation is possible, although it is by no means a hands-off process—in fact, it requires a substantial amount of design and regulatory oversight.This collection brings together leading experts from academia, government, and big business to discuss the lessons learned from experiences such as California's market meltdown as well as the ill-conceived policy choices that contributed to those failures. More importantly, the essays that comprise Electricity Deregulation offer a number of innovative prescriptions for the successful design of deregulated electricity markets. Written with economists and professionals associated with each of the network industries in mind, this comprehensive volume provides a timely and astute deliberation on the many risks and rewards of electricity deregulation.

Can the 'invisible hand' handle money? George Selgin challenges the view that government regulation creates monetary order and stability, and instead shows it to be the main source of monetary crisis. The volume is divided into three sections: * Part I refutes conventional wisdom holding that any monetary system lacking government regulation is 'inherently unstable', and looks at the workings of market forces in an otherwise unregulated banking system. * Part II draws on both theory and historical experience to show how various kinds of government interference undermine the inherent efficiency, safety, and stability of a free monetary system. * Part III completes the argument by addressing the popular misconception that a monetary system is unsound unless it delivers a stable output price-level.

The standard wisdom among political scientists has been that "iron triangles" operated among regulatory agencies, the regulated industries, and members of Congress, all presumably with a stake in preserving regulation that protected the industries from competition. Despite almost unanimous agreement among economists that such regulation was inefficient, it seemed highly unlikely that deregulation could occur. Yet between 1975 and 1980 major deregulatory changes that strongly favored competition did take place in a wide range of industries. The results are familiar to airline passengers, users of telephone service, and trucking freight shippers, among others. Martha Derthick and Paul J. Quirk ask why this deregulation happened. How did a diffuse public interest prevail over the powerful industry and union interests that sought to preserve regulation? Why did the regulatory commissions, which were expected to be a major obstacle to deregulation, instead take the initiative on behalf of it? And why did influential members of Congress push for even greater deregulation? The authors concentrate on three cases: airlines, trucking, and telecommunications. They find important similarities among the cases and discuss the implications of these findings for two broader topics: the role that economic analysis has played in policy change, and the capacity of the American political system for transcending narrow interests.

The standard wisdom among political scientists has been that "iron triangles" operated among regulatory agencies, the regulated industries, and members of Congress, all presumably with a stake in preserving regulation that protected the industries from competition. Despite almost unanimous agreement among economists that such regulation was inefficient, it seemed highly unlikely that deregulation could occur. Yet between 1975 and 1980 major deregulatory changes that strongly favored competition did take place in a wide range of industries. The results are familiar to airline passengers, users of telephone service, and trucking freight shippers, among others. Martha Derthick and Paul J. Quirk ask why this deregulation happened. How did a diffuse public interest prevail over the powerful industry and union interests that sought to preserve regulation? Why did the regulatory commissions, which were expected to be a major obstacle to deregulation, instead take the initiative on behalf of it? And why did influential members of Congress push for even greater deregulation? The authors concentrate on three cases: airlines, trucking, and telecommunications. They find important similarities among the cases and discuss the implications of these findings for two broader topics: the role that economic analysis has played in policy change, and the capacity of the American political system for transcending narrow interests.

Can the 'invisible hand' handle money? George Selgin challenges the view that government regulation creates monetary order and stability, and instead shows it to be the main source of monetary crisis. The volume is divided into three sections: * Part I refutes conventional wisdom holding that any monetary system lacking government regulation is 'inherently unstable', and looks at the workings of market forces in an otherwise unregulated banking system. * Part II draws on both theory and historical experience to show how various kinds of government interference undermine the inherent efficiency, safety, and stability of a free monetary system. * Part III completes the argument by addressing the popular misconception that a monetary system is unsound unless it delivers a stable output price-level.

The electricity market has experienced enormous setbacks in delivering on the promise of deregulation. In theory, deregulating the electricity market would increase the efficiency of the industry by producing electricity at lower costs and passing those cost savings on to customers. As Electricity Deregulation shows, successful deregulation is possible, although it is by no means a hands-off process—in fact, it requires a substantial amount of design and regulatory oversight.This collection brings together leading experts from academia, government, and big business to discuss the lessons learned from experiences such as California's market meltdown as well as the ill-conceived policy choices that contributed to those failures. More importantly, the essays that comprise Electricity Deregulation offer a number of innovative prescriptions for the successful design of deregulated electricity markets. Written with economists and professionals associated with each of the network industries in mind, this comprehensive volume provides a timely and astute deliberation on the many risks and rewards of electricity deregulation.

In Last Exit Clifford Winston reminds us that transportation services and infrastructure in the United States were originally introduced by private firms. The case for subsequent public ownership and management of the system was weak, in his view, and here he assesses the case for privatization and deregulation to greatly improve Americans' satisfaction with their transportation systems.

Canada and the United States exchange the world's highest level of bilateral trade, valued at $1.4 billion a day. Two-thirds of this trade travels on trucks. Heavy Traffic examines the way in which the regulatory reform of American and Canadian trucking, coupled with free trade, has internationalized this vital industry. Before deregulation, restrictive entry rules had fostered two separate national highway transportation markets, and most international traffic had to be exchanged at the border. When the United States deregulated first, the imbalance between its opened market and Canada's still-restricted one produced a surprisingly difficult bilateral dispute. American deregulation was motivated by domestic incentives, but the subsequent Canadian deregulation blended domestic incentives with transborder rate comparisons and concerns about trade competitiveness. Daniel Madar shows that deregulation created a de facto regime of free trade in trucking services. Removing regulatory barriers has enabled Canadian and American carriers to follow the expansion of transborder traffic that began with the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement and continues with NAFTA. The services available with deregulated trucking have also supported sweeping changes in industrial logistics. As transborder traffic has surged, the two countries' carriers -- from billion-dollar corporations to family firms -- have exploited the latitude provided by deregulation. This book is a valuable contribution to our understanding of the policy processes and economic conditions that led to trucking deregulation. As a study in public policy formation and the international effects of reform, it will be of interest to students and scholars of political economy, international relations, and transportation.

In the late 1990s, the formerly staid and monopolistic electric utility industry entered an era of freewheeling competition and deregulation, allowing American consumers to buy electricity from any company offering it. In this book, Richard F. Hirsh explains how and why this radical restructuring has occurred. Hirsh starts by describing the successful campaign waged by utility managers in the first decade of the twentieth century to protect their industry from competition. The regulated system that emerged had the unanticipated consequence of endowing utility managers with great political and economic power. Seven decades later, a series of largely unanticipated events, including technological stagnation in traditional generating equipment, the 1973 energy crisis, and the rise of the environmental movement, undermined the managers' control of the system. New players, such as academics, environmental advocates, politicians, and potential competitors, wrested control from power company managers by challenging utilities' standing as "natural monopolies" and by questioning whether their firms provided universal benefits. In other words, the once-closed system came under increasing pressure to transform itself. Hirsh follows the flow of power as this transformation occurred. He also examines the relationship between technological change and regulation, showing how innovations such as cogeneration and renewable energy technologies stimulated questions about the value of government oversight of the system. And he shows how the increasing prominence of ideas such as conservation, energy efficiency, and free markets helped propel the system toward open competition. Though the new electric utility system is still in its infancy, Hirsh's perceptive account of its birth will help readers think more rationally about its future.

Recent legislation deregulating the airline and trucking industries has enhanced competition and reduced real transportation prices by putting pressure on firms to operate more efficiently. Yet, with the entry of many new small airlines and trucking firms facing the financial pressures of competition, many legislators fear that public safety will be reduced due to compromises in maintenance, equipment replacement, recruitment and training. This volume examines the theoretical and empirical issues involved in the debate on the relationship between safety and economic performance in the airline and trucking industries. Contributors discuss such factors as the role of government as provider of safety oversight personnel and airport and road space quality, and conclude that the government has not acted quickly enough to provide the additional safety resources to meet the changed needs of the two industries, though the evidence does not support the notion that deregulation has compromised safety.

Karl Persson surveys a broad sweep of economic history, examining one of the most crucial markets--grain--in order to demonstrate more general points. Grain Markets in Europe traces the markets' early regulation, their poor performance and the frequent market failures. Price volatility caused by harvest shocks was of major concern for central and local government because of the unrest it caused. Persson uses insights from development economics, explores contemporary economic thought on the advantages of free trade, and measures the extent of market integration using the latest econometric methods.

In the late 1990s, the formerly staid and monopolistic electric utility industry entered an era of freewheeling competition and deregulation, allowing American consumers to buy electricity from any company offering it. In this book, Richard F. Hirsh explains how and why this radical restructuring has occurred. Hirsh starts by describing the successful campaign waged by utility managers in the first decade of the twentieth century to protect their industry from competition. The regulated system that emerged had the unanticipated consequence of endowing utility managers with great political and economic power. Seven decades later, a series of largely unanticipated events, including technological stagnation in traditional generating equipment, the 1973 energy crisis, and the rise of the environmental movement, undermined the managers' control of the system. New players, such as academics, environmental advocates, politicians, and potential competitors, wrested control from power company managers by challenging utilities' standing as "natural monopolies" and by questioning whether their firms provided universal benefits. In other words, the once-closed system came under increasing pressure to transform itself. Hirsh follows the flow of power as this transformation occurred. He also examines the relationship between technological change and regulation, showing how innovations such as cogeneration and renewable energy technologies stimulated questions about the value of government oversight of the system. And he shows how the increasing prominence of ideas such as conservation, energy efficiency, and free markets helped propel the system toward open competition. Though the new electric utility system is still in its infancy, Hirsh's perceptive account of its birth will help readers think more rationally about its future.

A lucid and up-to-date introduction to understanding electrical power utilities in an era of change Electric utilities worldwide are undergoing profound transformations: nationally owned systems are becoming privatized, privately owned systems that were previously regulated are becoming deregulated, and national systems are becoming international. Professionals in the power sector must now work in a new world in which an understanding of the principles of markets and how to evaluate investment projects under competition are essential. This text was written as a manual for the Russian Federal Energy Commission to train regional electricity rate regulators in the principles of economics and finance involved in regulating electricity markets and deregulating electricity generation. Requiring no familiarity with economics and using a minimum of mathematics, this book provides professionals in the power sector with the tools to face the new realities of electric utility operation. Designed both as a reference for practicing professionals and as a textbook for university and continuing education programs, Electricity Economics: Regulation and Deregulation discusses: The lessons learned from international experiences Competitive versus noncompetitive markets Cost and supply, profit, and economic efficiency The cost of capital, including net present value, discounting, and risk and return Wholesale power markets, generation expansion, and customer choice Specific international examples including the Californian, Norwegian, Spanish, and Argentine power sectors Plus numerous exercises to help clarify and support absorption of the concepts

In the late 1990s, the formerly staid and monopolistic electric utility industry entered an era of freewheeling competition and deregulation, allowing American consumers to buy electricity from any company offering it. In this book, Richard F. Hirsh explains how and why this radical restructuring has occurred. Hirsh starts by describing the successful campaign waged by utility managers in the first decade of the twentieth century to protect their industry from competition. The regulated system that emerged had the unanticipated consequence of endowing utility managers with great political and economic power. Seven decades later, a series of largely unanticipated events, including technological stagnation in traditional generating equipment, the 1973 energy crisis, and the rise of the environmental movement, undermined the managers' control of the system. New players, such as academics, environmental advocates, politicians, and potential competitors, wrested control from power company managers by challenging utilities' standing as "natural monopolies" and by questioning whether their firms provided universal benefits. In other words, the once-closed system came under increasing pressure to transform itself. Hirsh follows the flow of power as this transformation occurred. He also examines the relationship between technological change and regulation, showing how innovations such as cogeneration and renewable energy technologies stimulated questions about the value of government oversight of the system. And he shows how the increasing prominence of ideas such as conservation, energy efficiency, and free markets helped propel the system toward open competition. Though the new electric utility system is still in its infancy, Hirsh's perceptive account of its birth will help readers think more rationally about its future.

Long hours, low wages, and unsafe workplaces characterized sweatshops a hundred years ago. These same conditions plague American trucking today. Sweatshops on Wheels: Winners and Losers in Trucking Deregulation exposes the dark side of government deregulation in America's interstate trucking industry. In the years since deregulation in 1980, median earnings have dropped 30% and most long-haul truckers earn less than half of pre-regulation wages. Work weeks average more than sixty hours. Today, America's long-haul truckers are working harder and earning less than at any time during the last four decades. Written by a former long-haul trucker who now teaches industrial relations at Wayne State University, Sweatshops on Wheels raises crucial questions about the legacy of trucking deregulation in America and casts provocative new light on the issue of government deregulation in general.

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In the late 1990s, the formerly staid and monopolistic electric utility industry entered an era of freewheeling competition and deregulation, allowing American consumers to buy electricity from any company offering it. In this book, Richard F. Hirsh explains how and why this radical restructuring has occurred. Hirsh starts by describing the successful campaign waged by utility managers in the first decade of the twentieth century to protect their industry from competition. The regulated system that emerged had the unanticipated consequence of endowing utility managers with great political and economic power. Seven decades later, a series of largely unanticipated events, including technological stagnation in traditional generating equipment, the 1973 energy crisis, and the rise of the environmental movement, undermined the managers' control of the system. New players, such as academics, environmental advocates, politicians, and potential competitors, wrested control from power company managers by challenging utilities' standing as "natural monopolies" and by questioning whether their firms provided universal benefits. In other words, the once-closed system came under increasing pressure to transform itself. Hirsh follows the flow of power as this transformation occurred. He also examines the relationship between technological change and regulation, showing how innovations such as cogeneration and renewable energy technologies stimulated questions about the value of government oversight of the system. And he shows how the increasing prominence of ideas such as conservation, energy efficiency, and free markets helped propel the system toward open competition. Though the new electric utility system is still in its infancy, Hirsh's perceptive account of its birth will help readers think more rationally about its future.

In Last Exit Clifford Winston reminds us that transportation services and infrastructure in the United States were originally introduced by private firms. The case for subsequent public ownership and management of the system was weak, in his view, and here he assesses the case for privatization and deregulation to greatly improve Americans' satisfaction with their transportation systems.

All Fall Down traces the ways in which changes in financial structure and regulation eroded monetary control and led to historically high levels of debt relative to GDP in both developed and emerging economies. Rising stocks of debt drove the global financial system into crisis in 2008 when households, businesses, financial institutions and the public sector in some countries strained to generate sufficient income for debt service. The stagnation and fall in asset prices that followed began the process of unwinding that led to a run on the financial sector by the financial sector. This engaging examination describes critical developments that changed the structure of US financial markets as well as developments and innovations in US credit markets that created the context for crisis. It discusses the advent of dollar hegemony, the critical role of international reserves in generating credit, the emergence of the debt bubble in the 1980s and the mounting risks of debt in the new millennium. The author also proposes a systemic approach to monetary control, offering two new reform proposals. The analysis concludes that reforms are needed in order to support sustainable economic activity in the US and global economies. This volume will appeal to students and scholars of economics interested in international finance and banking, financial regulation and monetary policy implementation. It will also be of interest to business economists, lawyers, policymakers and journalists concerned with the effects of financial instability and involved in ongoing debates on financial and monetary reform.