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Chances are that you re not often called upon to execute a 360° tumbleturn while water skiing barefoot at work. But your everyday challenges may seem just as daunting if you are stuck in a "knower's" stance. In this fresh, accessible new book, seasoned organizational development practitioner Brian Hinken draws on the lessons from his own story of self-discovery - including his encounter with the elusive tumbleturn - to offer a rich collection of disciplines, frameworks, tools, and methods for overcoming the "secrets of a knower". With disarming humility, the author provides a practical map for moving from awareness to action, empowering us to be learners more focused on increasing our ability to produce desired results, than on protecting our reputation for knowing. Whether you re exploring your personal learning habits or seeking to develop a learning culture more broadly, this book will ease your journey.

Knowing Persons is an original study of Plato's account of personhood. For Plato, embodied persons are images of a disembodied ideal. The ideal person is a knower. Hence, the lives of embodied persons need to be understood according to Plato's metaphysics of imagery. For Gerson, Plato's account of embodied personhood is not accurately conflated with Cartesian dualism. Plato's dualism is more appropriately seen in the contrast between the ideal disembodied person and the embodied one than in the contrast between mind or soul and body.

Knowing Persons is an original study of Plato's account of personhood. For Plato, embodied persons are images of a disembodied ideal. The ideal person is a knower. Hence, the lives of embodied persons need to be understood according to Plato's metaphysics of imagery. For Gerson, Plato's account of embodied personhood is not accurately conflated with Cartesian dualism. Plato's dualism is more appropriately seen in the contrast between the ideal disembodied person and the embodied one than in the contrast between mind or soul and body.

Help your students to flourish as knowers with this updated series for first examination 2022 Written by experienced authors and examiners, this third edition encourages students to explore 'What is knowledge? Why, and how do we learn?'. This print and digital course guide helps shape students into internationally minded citizens as they critically assess the world around them. Students will explore real-world examples and independently reflect on their knowledge, growing as knowers. A dedicated chapter focuses on building skills for assessment, so students will be fully prepared to excel in the essay and exhibition.

"When there is duality, as it were, then one smells something, one sees something , one speaks something, one thinks something, one knows something. But, when to the knower of Brahman everything has become the Self, then what should one smell and through what, what should one hear and through what, what should one speak and through what, what should one think and through what, what should know and through what? That owing to which all this is known - through what, O Maitreyi, should one know the knower?"The Brhadaranyaka Upanishad is considered by some to be the greatest Upanishad. Likewise, the commentary of Shankara is also regarded as his greatest. The theme is the all-embracing Brahman. The commentary shows how the great truth of the Brahman-Atman identity forms the main purport of all the Vedantic texts in general, and this Upanishad in particular. With Devanagari Sanskrit and English, translation and commentary.

In this exploration of new territory between ethics and epistemology, Miranda Fricker argues that there is a distinctively epistemic type of injustice, in which someone is wronged specifically in their capacity as a knower. Justice is one of the oldest and most central themes in philosophy, but in order to reveal the ethical dimension of our epistemic practices the focus must shift to injustice. Fricker adjusts the philosophical lens so that we see through to the negative space that is epistemic injustice. The book explores two different types of epistemic injustice, each driven by a form of prejudice, and from this exploration comes a positive account of two corrective ethical-intellectual virtues. The characterization of these phenomena casts light on many issues, such as social power, prejudice, virtue, and the genealogy of knowledge, and it proposes a virtue epistemological account of testimony. In this ground-breaking book, the entanglements of reason and social power are traced in a new way, to reveal the different forms of epistemic injustice and their place in the broad pattern of social injustice.

What would something unlike us--a chimpanzee, say, or a computer--have to be able to do to qualify as a possible knower, like us? To answer this question at the very heart of our sense of ourselves, philosophers have long focused on intentionality and have looked to language as a key to this condition. Making It Explicit is an investigation into the nature of language--the social practices that distinguish us as rational, logical creatures--that revises the very terms of this inquiry. Where accounts of the relation between language and mind have traditionally rested on the concept of representation, this book sets out an alternate approach based on inference, and on a conception of certain kinds of implicit assessment that become explicit in language. Making It Explicit is the first attempt to work out in detail a theory that renders linguistic meaning in terms of use--in short, to explain how semantic content can be conferred on expressions and attitudes that are suitably caught up in social practices.At the center of this enterprise is a notion of discursive commitment. Being able to talk--and so in the fullest sense being able to think--is a matter of mastering the practices that govern such commitments, being able to keep track of one's own commitments and those of others. Assessing the pragmatic significance of speech acts is a matter of explaining the explicit in terms of the implicit. As he traces the inferential structure of the social practices within which things can be made conceptually explicit, the author defines the distinctively expressive role of logical vocabulary. This expressive account of language, mind, and logic is, finally, an account of who we are.

This book illustrates the unnaturalness of modern science and technology by tracing their cognitive, evolutionary, and religious origins. It elaborates that all premodern knowers faced inherent limits, and the West was able to develop modern science and technology because of its inherent contradictions forcing the transcendence of limitations.

"Bhagwan is a man who is both a lover and a knower and so much more besides. The very name of this Upanishad is lAtma Pooja - Worship of the Self it is absurd! Worship of yourself? Worship is always of someone else! But here you are the worshipped. lWorship loses all meaning, and he is continuously speaking in paradoxes. He is mixing two different realms. Bhagwan himself is also a great mixer and this volume is well-named "The Ultimate Alchemy " in that it is a verbal manifestation of Bhagwan's alchemical process".is written snide dustcoverr.

Guided by the Knower, Otulissa has studied long in the libraries of the Others; she has probed the ancient lore of the strange and powerful dire wolves of the Beyond. And at the Great Ga'Hoole tree itself she has uncovered secret histories of Guardians she thought she knew well! Attention Dear Reader! Great mysteries will be revealed to the attuned mind in these last Lost Tales of the Great Tree!

What would something unlike us--a chimpanzee, say, or a computer--have to be able to do to qualify as a possible knower, like us? To answer this question at the very heart of our sense of ourselves, philosophers have long focused on intentionality and have looked to language as a key to this condition. Making It Explicit is an investigation into the nature of language--the social practices that distinguish us as rational, logical creatures--that revises the very terms of this inquiry. Where accounts of the relation between language and mind have traditionally rested on the concept of representation, this book sets out an alternate approach based on inference, and on a conception of certain kinds of implicit assessment that become explicit in language. Making It Explicit is the first attempt to work out in detail a theory that renders linguistic meaning in terms of use--in short, to explain how semantic content can be conferred on expressions and attitudes that are suitably caught up in social practices.At the center of this enterprise is a notion of discursive commitment. Being able to talk--and so in the fullest sense being able to think--is a matter of mastering the practices that govern such commitments, being able to keep track of one's own commitments and those of others. Assessing the pragmatic significance of speech acts is a matter of explaining the explicit in terms of the implicit. As he traces the inferential structure of the social practices within which things can be made conceptually explicit, the author defines the distinctively expressive role of logical vocabulary. This expressive account of language, mind, and logic is, finally, an account of who we are.

The author critiques postmodern/narrative theory, with its underlying antirealist/constructivist philosophy that the knower makes rather than discovers reality. As an alternative, she introduces readers to the integrative/eclective therapy movement and proposes "modest realism."

The Revolt Against Dualism, first published in 1930, belongs to a tradition in philosophical theorizing that Arthur O. Lovejoy called "descriptive epistemology." Lovejoy's principal aim in this book is to clarify the distinction between the quite separate phenomena of the knower and the known, something regularly obvious to common sense, if not always to intellectual understanding. This work is as much an argument about the ineluctable differences between subject and object and between mentality and reality, as it is a subtle polemic against those who would stray far from acknowledging these differences. With a resolve that lasts over three hundred pages, Lovejoy offers candid evaluations of a generation's worth of philosophical discussions that address the problem of epistemological dualism. In his stunning new introduction, Jonathan B. Imber offers a reassessment of Lovejoy's career as a thinker and as an active participant in the worldly affairs of academic life. He introduces to a new generation of readers some enduring principles of the vocation of the scholar to which Lovejoy not only subscribed but to which he also gave substance through his activities as an academic man. The opening statement provides both a fit tribute to a great pioneer in the history of ideas, and an example of intellectual history in its own right. The Revolt Against Dualism will be a significant addition to the libraries of philosophers, sociologists, and history of ideas scholars.

Knowledge and its Limits presents a systematic new conception of knowledge as a kind of mental stage sensitive to the knower's environment. It makes a major contribution to the debate between externalist and internalist philosophies of mind, and breaks radically with the epistemological tradition of analyzing knowledge in terms of true belief. The theory casts new light on such philosophical problems as scepticism, evidence, probability and assertion, realism and anti-realism, and the limits of what can be known. The arguments are illustrated by rigorous models based on epistemic logic and probability theory. The result is a new way of doing epistemology and a notable contribution to the philosophy of mind.

What cannot be said about God, and how can we speak about God by negating what we say? Traveling across prominent negators, denialists, ineffectualists, paradoxographers, naysayers, ignorance-pretenders, unknowers, I-don't-knowers, and taciturns, Unsaying God: Negative Theology in Medieval Islam delves into the negative theological movements that flourished in the first seven centuries of Islam.Aydogan Kars argues that there were multiple, and often competing, strategies for self-negating speech in the vast field of theology. By focusing on Arabic and Persian textual sources, the book defines four distinct yet interconnected paths of negative speech formations on the nature of God that circulated in medieval Islamic world. Expanding its scope to Jewish intellectuals, Unsaying God also demonstrates that religious boundaries were easily transgressed as scholars from diverse sectarian or religious backgrounds could adopt similar paths of negative speech on God.This is the first book-length study of negative theology in Islam. It encompasses many fields of scholarship, and diverse intellectual schools and figures. Throughout, Kars demonstrates how seemingly different genres should be read in a more connected way in light of the cultural and intellectual history of Islam rather than as different opposing sets of orthodoxies and heterodoxies.

In this exploration of new territory between ethics and epistemology, Miranda Fricker argues that there is a distinctively epistemic type of injustice, in which someone is wronged specifically in their capacity as a knower. Justice is one of the oldest and most central themes in philosophy, but in order to reveal the ethical dimension of our epistemic practices the focus must shift to injustice. Fricker adjusts the philosophical lens so that we see through to the negative space that is epistemic injustice. The book explores two different types of epistemic injustice, each driven by a form of prejudice, and from this exploration comes a positive account of two corrective ethical-intellectual virtues. The characterization of these phenomena casts light on many issues, such as social power, prejudice, virtue, and the genealogy of knowledge, and it proposes a virtue epistemological account of testimony. In this ground-breaking book, the entanglements of reason and social power are traced in a new way, to reveal the different forms of epistemic injustice and their place in the broad pattern of social injustice.

Sociology and common sense both assume that there is an objective world that exists independently of the knower and that is accessible to competent perceivers. This assumption, and the idiomatic possibilities to which it gives rise, forms the basis of 'mundane reason'. As self-evident as mundane reason may appear, in this book the author shows that it is in fact historically emergent, culturally contingent and situationally constructed. Using close empirical observations from everyday settings in which people are concerned with 'what really happened' Pollner examines the practices of mundane reasoning in everyday life. He also analyses selected sociological texts and explores how mundane assumptions are used and sustained; how they affect conceptions of truth, mind, and reality; and how they may be brought within the purview of sociological analysis. The probing study will appeal widely to sociologists, social theorists, anthropologists, philosophers and psychologists, as well as to other readers concerned with understanding the social construction of the everyday world.

In this lively and accessible book Lorraine Code addresses one of the most controversial questions in contemporary theory of knowledge, a question of fundamental concern for feminist theory as well: Is the sex of the knower epistemologically significant? Responding in the affirmative, Code offers a radical alterantive to mainstream philosophy's terms for what counts as knowledge and how it is to be evaluated.Code first reviews the literature of established epistemologies and unmasks the prevailing assumption in Anglo-American philosophy that "the knower" is a value-free and ideologically neutral abstraction. Approaching knowledge as a social construct produced and validated through critical dialogue, she defines the knower in light of a conception of subjectivity based on a personal relational model. Code maps out the relevance of the particular people involved in knowing: their historical specificity, the kinds of relationships they have, the effects of social position and power on those relationships, and the ways in which knowledge can change both knower and known. In an exploration of the politics of knowledge that mainstream epistemologies sustain, she examines such issues as the function of knowledge in shaping institutions and the unequal distribution of cognitive resources.What Can She Know? will raise the level of debate concerning epistemological issues among philosophers, political and social scientists, and anyone interested in feminist theory.

The Revolt Against Dualism, first published in 1930, belongs to a tradition in philosophical theorizing that Arthur O. Lovejoy called "descriptive epistemology." Lovejoy's principal aim in this book is to clarify the distinction between the quite separate phenomena of the knower and the known, something regularly obvious to common sense, if not always to intellectual understanding. This work is as much an argument about the ineluctable differences between subject and object and between mentality and reality, as it is a subtle polemic against those who would stray far from acknowledging these differences. With a resolve that lasts over three hundred pages, Lovejoy offers candid evaluations of a generation's worth of philosophical discussions that address the problem of epistemological dualism. In his stunning new introduction, Jonathan B. Imber offers a reassessment of Lovejoy's career as a thinker and as an active participant in the worldly affairs of academic life. He introduces to a new generation of readers some enduring principles of the vocation of the scholar to which Lovejoy not only subscribed but to which he also gave substance through his activities as an academic man. The opening statement provides both a fit tribute to a great pioneer in the history of ideas, and an example of intellectual history in its own right. The Revolt Against Dualism will be a significant addition to the libraries of philosophers, sociologists, and history of ideas scholars.

Immediacy and Meaning seeks to approach the odd uneasiness at root in all metaphysical meaning; that the human knower attempts to mediate what cannot be mediated; that there is a pre-cognitive immemorial immediacy to Being that renders its participants irreducible, incommunicable and personal. The dilemma of metaphysics rests on the relationship between the spectator and the player, both as essential responses to the immediacy of Being. Immediacy and Meaning is an attempt to pause, but without retreat, to be a spectator within the game, to gain access into this immediate Presence, for a moment only perhaps, before the signatory failure into metaphysical language returns us to the mediated. J. K. Huysman's semi-autobiographical tetralogy anchors this book as a meditation, neither purely poetic nor only philosophical; it claims a unique territory when attempting to speak what cannot be spoken. The unnerving merits of nominalism, the difficulties of an honest appraisal of efficacious prayer, the mad sanity of the muse, the relationship between the uncreated and the created, and an originary ethics of antagonism, each serves to clarify the formation of a new epistemology.