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Like their predecessors, and like their male counterparts, most women philosophers of the 20th century have significant expertise in several specialities. Moreover, their work represents the gamut of 20th century philosophy's interests in moral pragmatism, logical positivism, philosophy of mathematics, of psychology, and of mind. Their writings include feminist philosophy, classical moral theory reevaluated in light of Kant, Mill, and the 19th century feminist and abolitionist movements, and issues in logic and perception. Included in the fourth volume of the series are discussions of L. Susan Stebbing, Edith Stein, Hedwig Conrad Martius, Simone de Beauvoir, Simone Weil, Mary Whiton Calkins, Gerda Walther, and others. While pre-20th century women philosophers were usually self-educated, those of the 20th century had greater access to academic preparation in philosophy. Yet, for all the advances made by women philosophers over two and a half millennia, the philosophers discussed in this volume were sometimes excluded from full participation in academic life, and sometimes denied full professional academic status.

The role of science in policymaking has gained unprecedented stature in the United States, raising questions about the place of science and scientific expertise in the democratic process. Some scientists have been given considerable epistemic authority in shaping policy on issues of great moral and cultural significance, and the politicizing of these issues has become highly contentious. Since World War II, most philosophers of science have purported the concept that science should be “value-free.” In Science, Policy and the Value-Free Ideal, Heather E. Douglas argues that such an ideal is neither adequate nor desirable for science. She contends that the moral responsibilities of scientists require the consideration of values even at the heart of science. She lobbies for a new ideal in which values serve an essential function throughout scientific inquiry, but where the role values play is constrained at key points, thus protecting the integrity and objectivity of science. In this vein, Douglas outlines a system for the application of values to guide scientists through points of uncertainty fraught with moral valence. Following a philosophical analysis of the historical background of science advising and the value-free ideal, Douglas defines how values should-and should not-function in science. She discusses the distinctive direct and indirect roles for values in reasoning, and outlines seven senses of objectivity, showing how each can be employed to determine the reliability of scientific claims. Douglas then uses these philosophical insights to clarify the distinction between junk science and sound science to be used in policymaking. In conclusion, she calls for greater openness on the values utilized in policymaking, and more public participation in the policymaking process, by suggesting various models for effective use of both the public and experts in key risk assessments.

Like their predecessors, and like their male counterparts, most women philosophers of the 20th century have significant expertise in several specialities. Moreover, their work represents the gamut of 20th century philosophy's interests in moral pragmatism, logical positivism, philosophy of mathematics, of psychology, and of mind. Their writings include feminist philosophy, classical moral theory reevaluated in light of Kant, Mill, and the 19th century feminist and abolitionist movements, and issues in logic and perception. Included in the fourth volume of the series are discussions of L. Susan Stebbing, Edith Stein, Hedwig Conrad Martius, Simone de Beauvoir, Simone Weil, Mary Whiton Calkins, Gerda Walther, and others. While pre-20th century women philosophers were usually self-educated, those of the 20th century had greater access to academic preparation in philosophy. Yet, for all the advances made by women philosophers over two and a half millennia, the philosophers discussed in this volume were sometimes excluded from full participation in academic life, and sometimes denied full professional academic status.

The role of science in policymaking has gained unprecedented stature in the United States, raising questions about the place of science and scientific expertise in the democratic process. Some scientists have been given considerable epistemic authority in shaping policy on issues of great moral and cultural significance, and the politicizing of these issues has become highly contentious. Since World War II, most philosophers of science have purported the concept that science should be “value-free.” In Science, Policy and the Value-Free Ideal, Heather E. Douglas argues that such an ideal is neither adequate nor desirable for science. She contends that the moral responsibilities of scientists require the consideration of values even at the heart of science. She lobbies for a new ideal in which values serve an essential function throughout scientific inquiry, but where the role values play is constrained at key points, thus protecting the integrity and objectivity of science. In this vein, Douglas outlines a system for the application of values to guide scientists through points of uncertainty fraught with moral valence. Following a philosophical analysis of the historical background of science advising and the value-free ideal, Douglas defines how values should-and should not-function in science. She discusses the distinctive direct and indirect roles for values in reasoning, and outlines seven senses of objectivity, showing how each can be employed to determine the reliability of scientific claims. Douglas then uses these philosophical insights to clarify the distinction between junk science and sound science to be used in policymaking. In conclusion, she calls for greater openness on the values utilized in policymaking, and more public participation in the policymaking process, by suggesting various models for effective use of both the public and experts in key risk assessments.