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Today?s traders want to know when volatility is a sign that the sky is falling (and they should stay out of the market), and when it is a sign of a possible trading opportunity. Inside Volatility Arbitrage can help them do this. Author and financial expert Alireza Javaheri uses the classic approach to evaluating volatility -- time series and financial econometrics -- in a way that he believes is superior to methods presently used by market participants. He also suggests that there may be "skewness" trading opportunities that can be used to trade the markets more profitably. Filled with in-depth insight and expert advice, Inside Volatility Arbitrage will help traders discover when "skewness" may present valuable trading opportunities as well as why it can be so profitable.

Today?s traders want to know when volatility is a sign that the sky is falling (and they should stay out of the market), and when it is a sign of a possible trading opportunity. Inside Volatility Arbitrage can help them do this. Author and financial expert Alireza Javaheri uses the classic approach to evaluating volatility -- time series and financial econometrics -- in a way that he believes is superior to methods presently used by market participants. He also suggests that there may be "skewness" trading opportunities that can be used to trade the markets more profitably. Filled with in-depth insight and expert advice, Inside Volatility Arbitrage will help traders discover when "skewness" may present valuable trading opportunities as well as why it can be so profitable.

Traditionally, the field of industrial organization has relied on two unrelated theories—the cross-section theory and the growth-of-firms theory—to explain cross-industry differences in concentration and within-industry skewness. The two approaches are based on very different mathematical structures and few researchers have attempted to relate them to each other. In this book, John Sutton unifies the two approaches through a theory that rests on three simple principles. The first two, a "survivor principle" that says that firms will not pursue loss-making strategies, and an "arbitrage principle" that says that if a profitable opportunity is available, some firm will take it, suffice to define a set of possible outcomes. The third, the "symmetry principle," says that the strategy used by a new entrant into any submarket depends neither on the entrants identity nor on its history in other submarkets. This allows researchers to bring together the roles of strategic interactions and of independence effects. The result is that the considerations motivating the cross-section tradition and those motivating the growth-of-firms tradition both drop out within a single game-theoretic model. This book follows Sutton's Sunk Costs and Market Structure, published by MIT Press in 1991.

Traditionally, the field of industrial organization has relied on two unrelated theories—the cross-section theory and the growth-of-firms theory—to explain cross-industry differences in concentration and within-industry skewness. The two approaches are based on very different mathematical structures and few researchers have attempted to relate them to each other. In this book, John Sutton unifies the two approaches through a theory that rests on three simple principles. The first two, a "survivor principle" that says that firms will not pursue loss-making strategies, and an "arbitrage principle" that says that if a profitable opportunity is available, some firm will take it, suffice to define a set of possible outcomes. The third, the "symmetry principle," says that the strategy used by a new entrant into any submarket depends neither on the entrants identity nor on its history in other submarkets. This allows researchers to bring together the roles of strategic interactions and of independence effects. The result is that the considerations motivating the cross-section tradition and those motivating the growth-of-firms tradition both drop out within a single game-theoretic model. This book follows Sutton's Sunk Costs and Market Structure, published by MIT Press in 1991.