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The great Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz, in his classic On War, introduced the idea of friction in war. Friction was one of the most important ideas that Clausewitz put forward. His application of the term is generally taken to be limited to events on the field of battle. But had Clausewitz lived to the end of the 20th century, he undoubtedly would have broadened his understanding of friction to include the nexus between war and policy making. He would have done so because his most fundamental insight, apart from the significance of friction in war, was his insistence upon the priority of policy over war.Cimbala applies the concept of friction to a number of 20th century cases of war and policy making. He also applies it to some plausible scenarios for the next century. Although many U.S. military planners and policy makers appear to place their faith in technology as the sine qua non of success in security and defense policy, technology can be self defeating and myopic if political and strategic vision are lacking. For example, the mindless pursuit of information warfare in all its varieties may convince potential U.S. opponents that infowar is a cost effective way of negating U.S. military power. A provocative analysis for scholars, students, military professionals and other policy makers involved with strategy and military policy issues.

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This intellectual history examines the reception of Carl von Clausewitz's military theories in Britain and the United States. In the first comprehensive study of the literature, Christopher Bassford argues that the impact of Clausewitzian theory has been underestimated and he follows the trail of Clausewitzian influence from pre-1873 Britain to 1945. Bassford finds that among those who explicitly discussed Clausewitz and his theories were soldiers, journalists, historians, political scientists and propagandists. In bringing this literature to light, Clausewitz in English makes a persuasive case for Clausewitzian theory having a major impact on the broad development of the British and American military thinking. It will be of interest to a wide range of military and intellectual historians.

Reevaluates the ideas of the German general, shows how his writings have been misinterpreted, and applies Clausewitzian theory to twentieth century political history

Reevaluates the ideas of the German general, shows how his writings have been misinterpreted, and applies Clausewitzian theory to twentieth century political history

While many scholars agree that Clausewitz's On War is frequently misunderstood, almost none have explored his methodology to see whether it might enhance our understanding of his concepts. This book lays out Clausewitz's methodology in a brisk and straightforward style. It then uses that as a basis for understanding his contributions to the ever growing body of knowledge of war. The specific contributions this study addresses are Clausewitz's theories concerning the nature of war, the relationship between war and politics, and several of the major principles of strategy he examined.These theories and principles lie at the heart of the current debates over the nature of contemporary conflict. They also underpin much of the instruction that prepares military and civilian leaders for their roles in the development and execution of military strategy. Thus, they are important even in circles where Clausewitz is only briefly studied. While understanding On War is no more a prerequisite for winning wars than knowledge is a requirement for exercising power, Clausewitz's opus has become something of an authoritative reference for those desiring to expand their knowledge of war. By linking method and concept, this book contributes significantly to that end.

This item is printed on demand - it takes 3-4 days longer - Neuware -This Festschrift commemorates the 50th anniversary of the foundation of the Clausewitz-Society in the Federal Republic of Germany of 1961. This volume follows the intentions of the Clausewitz-Society as described by one of its for-mer presidents: 'to view the current tasks of politics and strategy as reflected in the insights of Carl von Clausewitz and thus examine which of the principles and insights formulated by Clausewitz are still important today and are thus endowed with an enduring validity'. The board and the members of the Clausewitz-Society therefore supported the idea to examine how and when the works of Clausewitz have been interpreted in selected countries of our world; further, the goal here has been to analyze the role that Clausewitz's thought still plays in these countries. 380 pp. Englisch

Clausewitz is often quoted but more often misunderstood. On Clausewitz presents his central ideas about war and politics-such as war as an instrument of policy, the concept of Absolute War, friction and the fog of war-in a clear and systematic fashion.

Anything but a detached theorist, Clausewitz was as fully engaged in the intellectual and cultural currents of his time as in its political and military conflicts. Late-eighteenth century thought helped shape the analytic methods he developed for the study of war. The essays in this volume follow his career in a complex military society, together with that of other students of war, both friends and rivals, providing a broad perspective that leads to significant documents so far unknown or ignored. They add to our understanding of Clausewitz’s early ideas and their expansion into a comprehensive theory that continues to challenge our thinking about war today.

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While many scholars agree that Clausewitz's On War is frequently misunderstood, almost none have explored his methodology to see whether it might enhance our understanding of his concepts. This book lays out Clausewitz's methodology in a brisk and straightforward style. It then uses that as a basis for understanding his contributions to the ever growing body of knowledge of war. The specific contributions this study addresses are Clausewitz's theories concerning the nature of war, the relationship between war and politics, and several of the major principles of strategy he examined. These theories and principles lie at the heart of the current debates over the nature of contemporary conflict. They also underpin much of the instruction that prepares military and civilian leaders for their roles in the development and execution of military strategy. Thus, they are important even in circles where Clausewitz is only briefly studied. While understanding On War is no more a prerequisite for winning wars than knowledge is a requirement for exercising power, Clausewitz's opus has become something of an authoritative reference for those desiring to expand their knowledge of war. By linking method and concept, this book contributes significantly to that end.

While many scholars agree that Clausewitz's On War is frequently misunderstood, almost none have explored his methodology to see whether it might enhance our understanding of his concepts. This book lays out Clausewitz's methodology in a brisk and straightforward style. It then uses that as a basis for understanding his contributions to the ever growing body of knowledge of war. The specific contributions this study addresses are Clausewitz's theories concerning the nature of war, the relationship between war and politics, and several of the major principles of strategy he examined.These theories and principles lie at the heart of the current debates over the nature of contemporary conflict. They also underpin much of the instruction that prepares military and civilian leaders for their roles in the development and execution of military strategy. Thus, they are important even in circles where Clausewitz is only briefly studied. While understanding On War is no more a prerequisite for winning wars than knowledge is a requirement for exercising power, Clausewitz's opus has become something of an authoritative reference for those desiring to expand their knowledge of war. By linking method and concept, this book contributes significantly to that end.

Unread book in perfect condition.

Think about strategy and sharpen judgment in an unpredictable environment Carl von Clausewitz is widely acknowledged as one of the most important of the major strategic theorists; he's been read by Eisenhower, Kissinger, Patton, Chairman Mao, and numerous other leaders. In Clausewitz on Strategy, the Boston Consulting Group's Strategy Institute has excerpted those passages most relevant to business strategy from Clausewitz's classic text On War, the most general, applicable, and enduring work of strategy in the modern West and a source of insight into the nature of conflict, whether on the battlefield or in the boardroom. This book offers Clausewitz's framework for self-education--a way to train the reader's thinking. Clausewitz speaks the mind of the executive, revealing logic that those interested in strategic thinking and practice will find invaluable. He presents unique ideas, such as the idea that friction--unexpected interference--is an intrinsic part of strategy. The Boston Consulting Group is one of the world's leading management consulting firms whose clients include many of the world's industry leaders. Tiha von Ghyczy (Charlottesville, VA) has been a faculty member and Director of Business Projects at the Darden School of Business since 1996. While with The Boston Consulting Group, he assumed responsibility for the practice groups in manufacturing/time-based competition and high technology. He has published numerous articles and books on vision and strategy. Bolko von Oetinger (Munich, Germany) is a Senior Vice President of BCG. Christopher Bassford (Washington, DC) is presently a Professor of Strategy at the National War College in Washington, DC, and the author of several books, including Clausewitz in English: The Reception of Clausewitz in Britain and America, 1815-1945.

The great Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz, in his classic On War, introduced the idea of friction in war. Friction was one of the most important ideas that Clausewitz put forward. His application of the term is generally taken to be limited to events on the field of battle. But had Clausewitz lived to the end of the 20th century, he undoubtedly would have broadened his understanding of friction to include the nexus between war and policy making. He would have done so because his most fundamental insight, apart from the significance of friction in war, was his insistence upon the priority of policy over war.Cimbala applies the concept of friction to a number of 20th century cases of war and policy making. He also applies it to some plausible scenarios for the next century. Although many U.S. military planners and policy makers appear to place their faith in technology as the sine qua non of success in security and defense policy, technology can be self defeating and myopic if political and strategic vision are lacking. For example, the mindless pursuit of information warfare in all its varieties may convince potential U.S. opponents that infowar is a cost effective way of negating U.S. military power. A provocative analysis for scholars, students, military professionals and other policy makers involved with strategy and military policy issues.

Blending detailed contextual analysis with issues in modern-day international relations this book provides a major new analysis of the theory of Clausewitz and its relevance to contemporary society. This book argues that Clausewitz developed a wide-ranging political theory of war by reflecting on the success, the limitations, and the failure of Napoleon's method of waging war, a theory, which is still relevant in light of contemporary conflict. This new interpretation is the result of reflecting on Clausewitz's theory in light of the new developments and lays down the foundation of a general theory of war by concentrating on Clausewitz's historical analyses of war campaigns. For the first time analysis of three paradigmatic military campaigns is placed at the centre of understanding surrounding Clausewitz's 'On War'. The author argues that the limitations of Napoleon's strategy, as revealed in Russia and in his final defeat, enabled Clausewitz to develop a general theory of war.

Reevaluates the ideas of the German general, shows how his writings have been misinterpreted, and applies Clausewitzian theory to twentieth century political history

Originally published in 1976, Clausewitz and the State presents a comprehensive analysis of one of the significant thinkers of modern Europe. Peter Paret combines social and military history and psychological interpretation with a study of Clausewitz's military theories and of his unduly neglected historical and political writing. This timely new edition includes a preface which allows Paret to recount the past thirty years of discussion on Clausewitz and respond to critics. A companion volume to Clausewitz's On War, this book is indispensable to anyone interested in Clausewitz and his theories, and their proper historical context.

Anything but a detached theorist, Clausewitz was as fully engaged in the intellectual and cultural currents of his time as in its political and military conflicts. Late-eighteenth century thought helped shape the analytic methods he developed for the study of war. The essays in this volume follow his career in a complex military society, together with that of other students of war, both friends and rivals, providing a broad perspective that leads to significant documents so far unknown or ignored. They add to our understanding of Clausewitz’s early ideas and their expansion into a comprehensive theory that continues to challenge our thinking about war today.

While many scholars agree that Clausewitz's On War is frequently misunderstood, almost none have explored his methodology to see whether it might enhance our understanding of his concepts. This book lays out Clausewitz's methodology in a brisk and straightforward style. It then uses that as a basis for understanding his contributions to the ever growing body of knowledge of war. The specific contributions this study addresses are Clausewitz's theories concerning the nature of war, the relationship between war and politics, and several of the major principles of strategy he examined. These theories and principles lie at the heart of the current debates over the nature of contemporary conflict. They also underpin much of the instruction that prepares military and civilian leaders for their roles in the development and execution of military strategy. Thus, they are important even in circles where Clausewitz is only briefly studied. While understanding On War is no more a prerequisite for winning wars than knowledge is a requirement for exercising power, Clausewitz's opus has become something of an authoritative reference for those desiring to expand their knowledge of war. By linking method and concept, this book contributes significantly to that end.