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The "oligopoly problem"—the question of how prices are formed when the market contains only a few competitors—is one of the more persistent problems in the history of economic thought. In this book Xavier Vives applies a modern game-theoretic approach to develop a theory of oligopoly pricing. Vives begins by relating classic contributions to the field—including those of Cournot, Bertrand, Edgeworth, Chamberlin, and Robinson—to modern game theory. In his discussion of basic game-theoretic tools and equilibrium, he pays particular attention to recent developments in the theory of supermodular games. The middle section of the book, an in-depth treatment of classic static models, provides specialized existence results, characterizations of equilibria, extensions to large markets, and an analysis of comparative statics with a view toward applied work. The final chapters examine commitment issues, entry, information transmission, and collusion using a variety of tools: two-stage games, the modeling of competition under asymmetric information and mechanism design theory, and the theory of repeated and dynamic games, including Markov perfect equilibrium and differential games.

The "oligopoly problem"―the question of how prices are formed when the market contains only a few competitors―is one of the more persistent problems in the history of economic thought. In this book Xavier Vives applies a modern game-theoretic approach to develop a theory of oligopoly pricing. Vives begins by relating classic contributions to the field―including those of Cournot, Bertrand, Edgeworth, Chamberlin, and Robinson―to modern game theory. In his discussion of basic game-theoretic tools and equilibrium, he pays particular attention to recent developments in the theory of supermodular games. The middle section of the book, an in-depth treatment of classic static models, provides specialized existence results, characterizations of equilibria, extensions to large markets, and an analysis of comparative statics with a view toward applied work. The final chapters examine commitment issues, entry, information transmission, and collusion using a variety of tools: two-stage games, the modeling of competition under asymmetric information and mechanism design theory, and the theory of repeated and dynamic games, including Markov perfect equilibrium and differential games.

The "oligopoly problem"―the question of how prices are formed when the market contains only a few competitors―is one of the more persistent problems in the history of economic thought. In this book Xavier Vives applies a modern game-theoretic approach to develop a theory of oligopoly pricing. Vives begins by relating classic contributions to the field―including those of Cournot, Bertrand, Edgeworth, Chamberlin, and Robinson―to modern game theory. In his discussion of basic game-theoretic tools and equilibrium, he pays particular attention to recent developments in the theory of supermodular games. The middle section of the book, an in-depth treatment of classic static models, provides specialized existence results, characterizations of equilibria, extensions to large markets, and an analysis of comparative statics with a view toward applied work. The final chapters examine commitment issues, entry, information transmission, and collusion using a variety of tools: two-stage games, the modeling of competition under asymmetric information and mechanism design theory, and the theory of repeated and dynamic games, including Markov perfect equilibrium and differential games.

James Friedman provides a thorough survey of oligopoly theory using numerical examples and careful verbal explanations to make the ideas clear and accessible. While the earlier ideas of Cournot, Hotelling, and Chamberlin are presented, the larger part of the book is devoted to the modern work on oligopoly that has resulted from the application of dynamic techniques and game theory to this area of economics. The book begins with static oligopoly theory. Cournot's model and its more recent elaborations are covered in the first substantive chapter. Then the Chamberlinian analysis of product differentiation, spatial competition, and characteristics space is set out. The subsequent chapters on modern work deal with reaction functions, advertising, oligopoly with capital, entry, and oligopoly using noncooperative game theory. A large bibliography is provided.

The "oligopoly problem"—the question of how prices are formed when the market contains only a few competitors—is one of the more persistent problems in the history of economic thought. In this book Xavier Vives applies a modern game-theoretic approach to develop a theory of oligopoly pricing. Vives begins by relating classic contributions to the field—including those of Cournot, Bertrand, Edgeworth, Chamberlin, and Robinson—to modern game theory. In his discussion of basic game-theoretic tools and equilibrium, he pays particular attention to recent developments in the theory of supermodular games. The middle section of the book, an in-depth treatment of classic static models, provides specialized existence results, characterizations of equilibria, extensions to large markets, and an analysis of comparative statics with a view toward applied work. The final chapters examine commitment issues, entry, information transmission, and collusion using a variety of tools: two-stage games, the modeling of competition under asymmetric information and mechanism design theory, and the theory of repeated and dynamic games, including Markov perfect equilibrium and differential games.

This book provides both an explanation of the inflation which has bedeviled economic policy in the West since the end of World War II and a micro-economic theory to purge Keynesian models of the Walrasian strain derived from Marshall's Principles. By focusing on what is taken to be the representative business firm of the twentieth century - the large corporation or megacorp - the microeconomic model presented in the book reverses the usual assumptions of economic analysis. Instead of assuming the existence of firms with no control over prices, the book examines how the megacorp uses its pricing power to finance its own internal rate of growth. The result is a determinant model of how prices are set under the sort of oligopolistic conditions which prevail in most modern industries throughout the world.

Celebrating the 150th anniversary of Cournot's work, which Mark Blaug has characterized as "..a book that for sheer originality and boldness of conception has no equal in the history of economics thought," this volume focuses on the properties and uses of Cournot's model of competition among the few. While there are many issues that Cournot explored in researches into the mathematical principles of the theory of wealth, the topic that he is most readily associated with--and which now is also enjoying a revival--is his model of oligopolistic interaction among firms. This revivial of interest in Cournot's model is due largely to increased emphasis by economists on capturing elements of imperfect competition and strategic behavior.

The factors that brought about the 2008 financial collapse are examined in this analysis that explores the systemic crisis of capitalism after two decades of neoliberal globalization. Samir Amin lays bare the relationship between dominating oligopolies and the globalization of the world economy and argues that the current crisis is a profound crisis of the capitalist system itself, bringing forward an era in which wars—and perhaps revolutions—will once again shake the world. The author examines the threat to the plutocracies of the United States, Europe, and Japan from decisions of recent G20 meetings and analyzes these powers' attempts to get back to the pre-2008 system and to impose their domination on the peoples of the South through intensifying military intervention by using institutions such as NATO. An alternative strategy which, by building on the advances made by progressive forces in Latin America, would allow for a more humane society through both the North and the South working together is proposed.

While there are many analyses of capital-labor relations in oligopoly industries, such as auto and steel, very little work has been written on competitive-sector industries, such as textiles. Truchil has written the only systematic case study in book form on the textile industry covering the post-World War II era. This book reveals the profound transformations the textile industry has undergone.

The factors that brought about the 2008 financial collapse are examined in this analysis that explores the systemic crisis of capitalism after two decades of neoliberal globalization. Samir Amin lays bare the relationship between dominating oligopolies and the globalization of the world economy and argues that the current crisis is a profound crisis of the capitalist system itself, bringing forward an era in which wars—and perhaps revolutions—will once again shake the world. The author examines the threat to the plutocracies of the United States, Europe, and Japan from decisions of recent G20 meetings and analyzes these powers' attempts to get back to the pre-2008 system and to impose their domination on the peoples of the South through intensifying military intervention by using institutions such as NATO. An alternative strategy which, by building on the advances made by progressive forces in Latin America, would allow for a more humane society through both the North and the South working together is proposed.

In this extensively revised and expanded edition of the 1978 classic, Samir Amin suggests new approaches to Marxian analysis of the crisis of the late capitalist system of generalized, financialized, and globalized oligopolies following on the financial collapse of 2008.Considering that Marx’s Capital—written before the emergence of imperialism as a decisive factor in capitalist accumulation—could provide no explanation for the persistent “underdevelopment” of the countries of the “global South,” Amin advances several important theoretical concepts extending traditional Marxian views of capitalist evolution. Most strikingly, he proposes adding to the model of reproduction in Volume II of Capital a Third Department of Production devoted to surplus absorption and explores the concept of “imperialist rent” by extending the Marxian “law of value” in the form of a new “law of globalized value.”Amin sees the present crisis as a moment in the second long crisis of the capitalist system, dating from the early 1970s (the first long crisis, he maintains, lasted from 1873 until 1945). He sees no exit from repeatedcrises under capitalism except the descent into barbarism. The challenge is not to escape from the crisis of capitalism—a hopeless project—but to escape from capitalism in crisis. And Amin reasserts his historical optimism as to the socialist project, expecting a “second wave” of socialist attempts that will stem from the self-liberating efforts of the nations and peoples of the South and will lead to an awakening of the Northern popular classes to join the awakening of the global South. This book has an important place among the theoretical resources for anyone involved in the study of contemporary Marxian economic and political theory.